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An Anxious Spring 
In France and other western countries, the standard means of 
popular collective action have changed surprisingly little in the 
last century. After a flurry of experimentation and trans- 
formation in the nineteenth century's middle decades, France 
settled into a collective-action repertoire that is now wearily 
familiar: strikes, demonstrations, meetings, rallies, election 
campaigns and social movements became o'rdinary people's usual ways 
of getting collective business done -- if they did collective 
business at all. ~lthough the decor of such actions has altered 
somewhat, and their aims - have varied w'idely, the basic routines 
have a remarkable constancy. 
Under these circumstances, we might reasonably expect that 
powerholders improve their ability to baffle popular collective 
action faster than ordinary people develop skill in using the 
available forms. Since ordinary people are likely to have more of 
their total livelihood at stake in any particular action, however, 
we might also expect moments of vulnerability on the part of 
powerholders to encourage surges of popular collective action, and 
occasional victories of ordinary people to occur at those moments 
of opportunity. This essay follows those guesses through a 
description of big moments of popular collective action in the Ile 
de France -- Paris and its region -- during the twentieth century. 
In 1906, spring found France agitated. There was plenty to 
be nervous about. Government employees were demanding the right 
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to organize, national labor federations were becoming 
ostentatiously muscular, and defenders of the Catholic Church were 
up in arms. Legislative elections, furthermore, were coming up on 
6 and 14 May. For the first time, the newly unified Socialist 
Party was running candidates almost everywhere. A heated campaign 
raged through April, and on into May. 
This time, too, organized Catholics had a real grievance. 
The government had enacted official separation of church and state 
at the end of 1905. All religions were now, at least officially, 
equal. Duly registered "religious associations" were henceforth 
to operate church institutions.  he government had chosen 
February to begin inventories of church property before 
transferring control to the new associations. On the first day of 
February, opponents of the inventories barricaded paris' churches . . 
of Saint-Clotilde and Saint-Pierre-du-Gros-Caillou, fought off the 
police who came to assure the inventories, and forced the unwanted 
visitors to chop their way in. Among the arrested at 
Sainte-Clotilde were counts Louis de Bourbon and Guy de la 
Rochefoucauld. Aristocratic legitimists were joining the ordinary 
faithful in their resistance. 
The struggle at Sainte-Clotilde and Saint-pierre-du- 
Gros-Caillou began a bitter series of confrontations in Paris and 
in the provinces. The most consequential occurred in Boeschepe 
(~ord) on 6   arch. There, the son of an inventorying official 
defended his father by fatally shooting a demonstrator. The 
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parliamentary debate on the killing brought down the government. 
Ten days later, the new government sent its agents instructions to 
suspend inventories if open resistance seemed likely. By April, 
toe- to- toe confrontations had .become less frequent , but had not 
disappeared. 
The spring of 1906 also brought widespread owner-worker 
conflict. In Toulon, for example, April began with waiters on 
strike. On Saturday 31 March, striking waiters had marched 
through the city's streets, smashing the windows of cafes that 
remained open. ' On Sunday 1 April, waiters demonstrated again. 
  hat night the wine steward at the cafe de la Rotonde, once more 
surrounded and taunted by strikers, pulled out his stiletto and 
stabbed Jean Bruno, a waiter .from nearby ~ ~ z r e s .  Bruno died on 
the spot. Fearing a junction of leftist workers from the arsenal 
with the striking cafe employees, and faced with the refusal of 
the Socialist mayor to forbid demonstrations, the prefect himself 
took over. Three days later, Toulon's strikers held hostage a 
police officer whom the prefect had sent as his delegate; the 
strikers demanded permission to march. Toulon's struggles 
continued through the month. 
~ndustrial conflict was thriving in northern France as well. 
After the disaster of Courrigres (10 March), in which 1,101 miners 
died in a giant explosion and subsequent underground fires, much 
of the coalfield of pas-de-Calais roared out on strike. Georges 
~lgmenceau, becoming the new government's Minister of the Interior 
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on 13 March, soon sent troops to guard the mines; for roughly 
60,000 strikers, Cle'menceau put 20,000 soldiers in the field. The 
soldiers found themselves protecting both mine property against 
destruction by miners and non-striking miners against the attacks ' 
of their fellows. 
During April, the coalfield battles continued. 1n the 
Pas-de-Calais and the Nord, miners blocked pitheads, roughed up 
comrades who stayed on the job, and stoned the trains bringing 
scabs from Belgium. On 2 April, a thousand workers showing red 
flags marched into Billy-Montigny to demand the release of miners 
jailed during earlier set-tos. On 4 April, the '557 men and 40 - 
boys digging coal underground at Ligny-lez-Aire joined the 
thousands of miners in neighboring villages who were already on 
strike. On 5 ~ ~ r i l ,  women gathered at the guarded Courrieres pit 
no. 4 outside of Billy-Montigy, stoned the personnel who entered 
or left, then tried to break in and press the search for miners 
still trapped below. On 9 April the wives of miners at 
Billy-Montigny demonstrated with black, red, and tricolor flags. 
More confrontations, some involving detonat.ions of dynamite, 
occurred in the northern minefields almost every day from then to 
the month's end. Cl6menceau activated the cavalry. Forty-odd 
union leaders went to jail. ~ h u s  Cl&nenceau's reputation began to 
shift. From Cl&menceau, implacable Jacobin and scourge of 
governments, he became Cl&menceau, strikebreaker. 
In addition to miners, many other workers of northern France 
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joined April's action. On 4 April, for example, a crowd in 
Roubaix attacked the carriage of former minister Jules ~gline, who 
had come to confer with the city's industrialists. On 6 April, 
strikers at Fressenneville, Sornrne, broke the windows of the lock 
factory in which they worked, then went on to shatter the windows 
of non-strikers, as well as to sack and burn the house of the 
factory owner; they sang the Marseillaise and the Carmagnole as 
they smashed. 
Nor were striking waiters, locksmiths, and miners alone. 
I 
Here ar'e some more items from April's calendar: 
1 April 1906: .Twenty-odd Jews, impatient to emigrate to 
Canada, broke into the Paris offices of the Jewish 
Colonization Association and tore them up. 
8 April: The official who came to inventory the property of 
. the church in Saint-Amans (~ozsre) met a hail of stones and a 
barricaded door before retreating to try again some other 
day. 
10 April: Truckers who were on strike in Grenoble tried to 
unhitch the horses from the wagon carrying the effects of the 
new chief of gendarmerie; gendarmes and police fought them 
off. 
1 1 1  12 April: Striking pitmen in the southern .minefield 
of ~ l b s  (Gard) gathered in the city streets and fought with 
non-strikers; on the 12th, 250 of them marched with a red 
flag. 
11 April: An important branch of the postal service (the 
sous-agents) went on strike. The government requisitioned 
troops to replace them. 
13 April: Thousands ' of Catholics marched through 
Montpellier, battling the police as they protested the 
disestablishment of their church. 
14 April: Workers of Limoges marched with red flags, and 
with a black flag bearing the word Germinal; they went to the 
tomb of vardelle, a worker who had died in demonstrations the- 
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previous year. 200 anarchists followed the black flag from 
the cemetery, sang revolutionary songs, stopped at the 
barracks to jeer the local garrison, then moved on to the 
city center. Police seized their banner and broke them up. 
15 April: Demonstrating textile strikers ,battled gendarmes 
in Voiron, near Grenoble; when troops arrived four days 
later, much of the city's labor force struck to demand their 
removal. 
16 April: Supporters of conservative and republican 
candidates for the Chamber of Deputies bloodied each other in 
~ille-~al-~omm&e (Vienne) . 
17 April: In the course of a strike, about a thousand wool 
workers of Lavelanet (Arigge) gutted the houses of local 
employers. That same day, French construction workers in 
Toul and ~ruley attacked Italians who had come to work on the 
fortifications. 
18 April: The striking miners of ~ 1 6 s  fought nonstrikers and 
tried to overturn the carriage of the mine's superintendent. 
21 April: Retail and business clerks on strike in Lorient 
(Morbihan) threw up barricades and fought off soldiers after 
attempting to close the city's businesses. 
22 April: In Brest, a meeting of some 3,000 Socialists ended 
in a street battle with supporters of an antisocialist 
candidate. 
23 Apzil: Striking and ?on-striking masons fought each other 
in Chatelguyon (Puy-de-Dome) . 
25 April: ~arseilie's printers massed at their labor 
exchange, declared themselves on strike, and proceeded -to 
non-striking printshops; the thousand workers who arrived at 
the Moullot printing plant confronted police. 
26 April: ~ ' ~ u m a n i t g  published a manifesto of the Socialist 
International calling for a strike-demonstration on the 1st 
of May. 
27 April: ~lsmenceau called in 26,000 troops to reinforce 
Paris' garrison of 15,000 men. A dynamite charge went off at 
the Argenteuil viaduct, but failed to destroy it. 
Demonstrators again battled troops in Lorient. 
30 April: Paris' prefect of police, Lgpine, stationed 50,000 
troops and police throughout the city. An army lieutenant in 
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uniform appeared at the Paris labor exchange, declared 
himself a Socialist, and said he would never fire on his 
brother workers; he was arrested at the exit, and carted off 
to jail. 
Much of France seemed to be fighting, striking, or both at once. 
May Days P a s t  
In Paris, meanwhile, the Prefect of Police was readying his 
forces for the 1st of May, 1906. May Day had already passed its 
second decade as the international festival of the working class. 
At its Chicago Congress of 1884, America's Federation of Organized 
Trades fixed on 1 May 1886 as the starting point of a great 
campaign for the eight-hour day. American workers responded by 
turning the old feast into a giant display of workers' strength. 
In 1889 the Second International, convening in Paris, designated 1 
May 1890 as an international day of demonstration for the 
eight-hour day. Back then, le ~ Z r e  ~einard (alias  mile Pouget) 
likened the new holiday to the great day in 1870 when "everyone" 
had left work to follow Victor Noir's funeral procession. 
Victor Noir had worked at Henri Rochefort's muckraking paper 
~a Marseillaise. Louis Napoleon's kinsman Prince Pierre Bonaparte 
had killed ~ 0 i r  in an altercation during preparations for a duel 
'oetween Prince Pierre and an editor of the paper; to mourn Noir 
ostentatiously was to demonstrate opposition to the imperial 
regime, without taking the risk of a manifestly political gesture. 
After all, could the regime risk punishing people for mourning a 
man who really had been murdered? The moment was too' good to 
miss. 
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May Day had some of the same appeal: a holiday stolen back 
from the rich and powerful. In 1890, in fact,  re Peinard 
suggested taking advantage of the holiday' by helping oneself at 
the city's bright new department stores, which so blatantly 
pandered to the bourgeoisie: "The Louvres, the Printemps, the 
Belle ~ardiniGres, and the Potins reach out their arms and make 
eyes at us: It's so nice to have a new overcoat on your back, or 
good shoes on your feet!" (Pouget 1976: 33). "You have to be in 
the street to deal with social problems," declared the Pere 
Peinard, "and to see clearly who has too much to live on and who 
has too little" (Pouget 1976: 33). 
.When the director of Le  re Peinard received a sentence of 
15 months in jail and 2,000 francs fine for publishing that issue, ' 
the paper put out a broadside. Signed, as usual, by Le  ere 
Peinard, the new text trumpeted: 
And why? Because I shot off my mouth about the May Day 
demonstration. YOU can bet I'm not going to shut up. 1'11 
keep on saying that the populo is being robbed, sacked, and 
assassinated, and that when a chance like the first of May 
comes along you'd have to be nuts not to grab it. In all 
this, what the big shots really don't like is when you yell 
at their Rothschild. He's their god, that animal. To hell 
with him. He's not immortal. After all, they cut off ~ o u i s  
XVI's head (A.N. B B ~ *  1816). 
On May Day 1890, the demonstrations and strikes of Paris echoed 
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Pere Peinard's rebellious theme. 
That was the May Day spirit. In 1906, Jacques Turbin wrote a 
song called  he General Strike". Its first two verses ran: 
Let's go, men of every craft, 
Every land of the whole world 
Let's make the same effort everywhere 
At the same moment, of our own free will: 
Let's all go on strike! 
Tired of being driven by force 
To work hard, like mere cattle, 
And tired of living without hope 
From day to day, from night to night: 
Let's all go on strike! (~r6cy 1969: 97) 
The idea that workers could liberate themselves through one great 
effort resonated with daily experience. 
The holiday had a longer-range political message 'as well. 
Since 1890, France's May Day had been the annual rehearsal for the 
general strike, the revolutionary holiday workers seized for 
themselves. From the start, French workers -- especially those 
aligned with "collectivist" socialism rather than anarcho- 
syndicalism -- had used May Day to demand the eight-hour day, 
voice their shared grievances, and demonstrate their strength. At 
its Bourges Congress of 1904, the ~onf6dgration ~6ngrale du 
Travail had committed itself to a drive for the eight-hour day, 
focused on the 1st of May, 1906. Their official program had 
called for workers to walk off the job after eight hours from that 
day forward. 
Ile de France 9 
Hay Day 1906 
In 1906, the moment seemed well chosen. Since 1886, the 
International had kept the eight-hour day on its own agenda. 1n 
1905, French Socialists had joined to form the unified Socialist 
Party (PSU) , which became the French Section of the Workers' 
International (SFIO). Although Socialists had cooperated with 
governments intermittently since the first entry of a Socialist 
into the cabinet in 1889, the party had broken with the government 
1 in November 1905 over the right of schoolteachers to strike. 
i After wielding some influence in the election of the less 
i conservative candidate, Armand ~alligres, President of France in 
I January 1906, the party was driving for 'success in the legislative 
elections of May. Support from the CGT -- which was officially 
I 
apolitical, and actually quite resistant to party control -- would 
help the Socialists consolidate their support. Thus the party had 
1 , '  exceptional incentives to align itself with the workers' movement. 
Furthermore, the recent failed revolution in Russia offered a 
I concrete example of a popular rising in a .repressive state. The 
formation of Soviets and the temporary success of general strikes 
I in Moscow and St. Petersburg held out the possibility that workers 
I in other countries could act for themselves. (The appeal of 
Russia's example was so great that Jean Jaures himself felt 
I obliged to write, in ~umanitg of 5 November 1905, that "When the 
French working class interprets 'the revolutionary events in 
I -  Russia, it should not forget for an instant that it already has 
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the universal suffrage which the Russian proletariat -is trying to 
seize from tsarism": ~aurss 1976: 124.) Many labor activists 
looked forward to May Day 1906 as the start of the great General 
Strike that would destroy French capitalism. A pamphlet 
circulated by the Federation of Construction Trades read: 
The eight-hour day.wil1 be nothing but an advance payment, an 
aperitif if you will, before the main course which will soon 
be served when workers decide to strike down the parasites of 
capitalism by a general strike which will be the social 
revolution, and which will establish a Communist regime 
(Lefranc 1967: 129) . 
Publishing his Reflections on Violence as a series of articles in 
Mouvement Socialiste from January to June 1906, Georges Sore1 
chose the right time for a hymn to the general strike. 
The CGT actually gave its affiliates two choices: 1) start an 
unlimited strike on 1 May, or 2) begin enforcing the eight-hour 
day then and there. A banner hung from the Paris Bourse du 
Travail. "Starting the 1st of May," it read, "we will only work 
eight hours a day" (Julliard 1965: 23). The CGT'S national 
committee found itself overwhelmed with calls for help -- help 
including inspirational speakers -- from union locals in Paris and 
elsewhere. The prefect put plainclothesmen on the trails of the 
committee members. 
On the 26th and 27th of April the prefect's staff filed 
detailed "prognostications" of workers' intentions, first, to take 
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May Day off and, second, to go on strike for a longer term. They 
based their estimates on a confidential report 'from a high CGT 
official. .The advisors predicted that 8,000 lithographers, 25,000 
carriage-makers, 5,000 metalworkers,. and so on, would begin 
indefinite strikes. 
Those predictions were well-informed. Indeed, some o.E them 
came true ahead of schedule. On 30 April, 10,000 automobile 
workers of the expected 25,000 in carriagemaking added themselves 
to the 1,200 already on strike. Nevertheless, the prefect's 
labor-watchers properly spotted construction workers as the most 
active participants: 10,OFJFJ masons, 5,000 stonecutters, 20,000 
painters, 2,000 carpenters and cabinetmakers, plus a full 30,000 
navvies entered their calculations. "Leaving aside the 
typographers and the jewelers-goldsmiths, who are currently on 
strike," the report concluded, 
we can count on 185,000 strikers in paris. But since the 
voluntary idleness of some leads to the forced idleness of 
others . . . the total number of strikers can be estimated at 
200,000. The most troublesome will be the navvies, the 
bakers, the grocers, and the hairdressers; having little hope 
of getting benefits by means of peaceful strikes, they will 
try to intimidate their employers through sabotage (A.N. F~ 
The prefect and his boss, clgmenceau, got the word. On 30 April, 
they had Griffuelhes, secretary of the CGT, arrested. In jail, he 
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joined his fellow committee member Pierre Monatte; ~lgmenceau had 
picked off Monatte earlier, at the height of the miners1 strike in 
the north, on the charge of having incited to riot in Lens. For 
show, a sonapartist leader (accused, implausibly, of subsidizing 
Monattels agitation in the minefields) went to jail as well. The 
government forbade 'parades and gatherings on 1 May. Then the 
prefect and the minister spread their forces through the city. 
After the fact, it is hard to say which explanation of what 
actually happened was correct: that repression worked or that the 
government had overestimated the threat. In any case, the large 
crowds of workers that gathered at the Bourse du Travail and in 
the nearby Place de la ~6publique during the day cheered militant 
speeches, but made no attempt to take over the city. s heir shouts 
for the day were "Long live the eight-hour day! Long live May 
Day" (Le Temps, 3 May 1906). ~uring the day, only a few scuffles 
between people in the street and police or dragoons broke the 
relative calm. 
Toward the end of the afternoon, however, groups of a few 
hundred activists formed in the streets radiating from the Place 
de la Republique, and faced off with troops or police. Some sang 
the ~nternationale or the Carmagnole as they challenged. A group 
of workers started to build barricades in the rue de Belleville. 
But the government forces clearly had the advantage. The official 
scorecard for the day ran: 
665 people arrested, with 173 held after questioning (among 
the 173, 53 were foreigners who would be deported, and 35 had 
Ile de France 13 
criminal records) 
1 chief inspector, 12 policemen and 3 gardes rgpublicains 
wounded 
12 demonstrators likewise wounded (Le Temps, 3 May 1906). 
No doubt many more demonstrators found it expedient not to report 
their injuries. Even if the civilian casualties ran several times 
the doze'n reported, however, May Day 1906 would still look mainly 
like a peaceful show of labor's strength- and determination, 
shadowed by the government's own display of strength and 
determination. 
During the following days, strikes multiplied. In Paris, 
about 70,000 construction workers lay down their tools on 2 May. 
(That figure came remarkably .close to the prefect's 
"prognostications" . )  Nationally, 158,000 workers -- more than a 
third of the year's total -- were on strike in May. After a high 
plateau from about 12 to 20 May, the national strike movement fell 
once more. 
In national labor history, the strike wave of 1906 marked a 
crucial transition. Despite the importance of the northern mines 
in March and April, it was the first national strike wave to be 
coordinated in Paris, and to concentrate most heavily in the paris 
region. For the first time, over the country as a whole all 
industrial sectors including agriculture struck at higher rates 
than normal. Proletarian workers such as the automobile makers of 
Paris played a far larger part in initiating the movement than 
ever before. The direct confrontation between labor's 
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organizations and the national government -- the first s-ince the 
July Monarchy -- set off the strike wave of April-May 1906 as a 
major claim of organized workers to exercise power at the national 
scale. As the wave rolled on, furthermore, May's legislative 
elections gave the Unified Socialist Party almost 900 thousand 
votes, and 51 seats in the Chamber. Although their claims were 
disputed, most of those Socialist deputies claimed to speak for 
the stri,kers of 1906. The passage of a Sunday rest law in July 
1906 and the establishment of a 'separate  ini is try of Labor in 
October reflected labor's new national strength. 
. Nevertheless, many observers, including the CGT's own 
leaders, read the outcome of their campaign as at best a standoff. 
The eight-hour day did not come to pass, the definitive General . 
.Strike failed to materialize, and even the show of strength in 
the capital went on within limits set clearly by the government's 
own force. That was not what many labor activists had in mind. 
When the CGT held its congress in Amiens during October 1906, 
furthermore, its famous Amiens Charter declared its unwillingness 
to tie itself to any party, including the Socialists. The Charter 
called for "complete emancipation" based on expropriation of 
capitalists, affirmed that today's syndicates would be tomorrow's 
producing units, and reiterated its faith in direct action by 
workers (Lefranc 1963: 151-152). The CGT's activists had not 
given up the effort to have labor show its own strength for its 
own ends. 
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May Day provided an occasion for muscle-flexing during each 
of the next few years. Although the Socialist party tried 
repeatedly to use May Day to its own advantage, the national 
unions maintained control of the event. Organized labor was not, 
however, always a,ble to show the same amount of muscle. As a 
confidential report to the Minister of the Interior put it just 
before May Day 1908: 
If the 1st of May 1906 was agitated, it was because the union 
rank-and-file thought they could get the eight-hour day from 
their bosses. The general failure of that effort, due to the 
'withdrawal of several large organizations and the lack of 
agreement among the rest, made the 1st of May 1907 a fairly 
calm day: the long strikes that followed May Day 1906 had 
exhausted the national unions, especially in metallurgy, 
which still hasn't recovered from that test (A.N. F~ 13267, 
26 ~ p r i l  1908). 
For 1908, the prefect of police predicted widespread observance of 
the unoffic'ial holiday in metals, construction, automobiles, 
tobacco, matches, and machine-building, with poorer showings in 
other industries. He also expected meetings, demonstrations, and 
declarations. He based his predictions on a large dossier of 
confidential reports from spies and informers within the labor 
movement . 
In general, the prefect's predictions came true. 
Increasingly, furthermore, the prefect's forces (backed by the 
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army) were able to contain the .holiday, and to reduce the 
likelihood that a general strike would issue from it. In 1910, 
indeed, the unions had so little hope of success that they 
cancelled the day's demonstrations. 
Still, May Day had not run its course. In 1911, about 4,000 
marchers, red flowers in their buttonholes, showed up for the 
festivities. When the marchers attempted to hold a rally in the . 
Place de la Concorde, police moved to break them up, and battles 
ensued; two policemen left wounded. Later, other demonstrators 
. clashed with police near the Place Saint-Paul. The same evening, 
when an orchestra in a Montmartre cabaret played the ~arseillaise, 
"antimilitarists" in the audience replied with the Internationale; 
a brawl ensued (Journal des ~gbats, 2 May 1911: 1). Tally for the 
day: sixty-odd arrests, a few dozen hurt. 
World War I cramped the May Day style, but did not eliminate 
the workers' holiday. The strike wave of 1919 and 1920 surpassed 
that of 1906; 2,047 officially-counted strikes brought out 1.3 
million workers in 1919; in 1920, 1.1 million workers joined 1,879 
strikes. What is more, both surges depended closely on the 
mobilization for May Day. 
By May Day 1919, the CGT was once again organizing a great 
demonstration and general strike for the eight-hour day, and the 
government was again forbidding demonstrators to assemble. under 
the pressure of those preparations on both sides, the Chamber 
passed its first enabling act for the eight-hour day. That move 
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transformed the CGT's program into a demand for immediate 
application of the law in the country's workplaces. The acquittal 
of Raoul Villain, who had assassinated ~aurzs five years earlier, 
added another grievance to the list. On May Day 1919, labor's 
marchers tried to reach the Palais Bourbon, in order to address 
their demands to the Chamber of Deputies. Police and troops 
blocked them. Before the day's barricades and battles were 
finished, at least one worker was dead, and 600 people were 
injured. 
In 1920, the railroad workers' union called its own strike 
for Play Day. The CGT's appeal to miners and other transport 
workers for a supporting strike on 3 May persuaded relatively few 
workers, and the railroad employees found themselves replaced by 
volunteers. The dream was fading: the sequence running from 
workers' holiday to general strike to revolution seemed less and 
less likely ever to occur. From 1933 to 1936, in the heat of 
great struggles among left, right, and center, some Parisian 
Communists took the 1st of May as a day for challenges to the 
regime and its police. Then May Day virtually disappeared as an 
occasion for shows of strength. 
Other People's Holidays 
, 
Other holidays, however, competed with May Day. The 14th of 
~ u l y ,  for example, continued to symbolize the regime's 
revolutionary origins. Made the official national holiday by 
victorious republicans in 1880, Bastille Day paraded the nation's 
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commitment, solidarity, and military might. For that very reason, 
it also provided a chance for different groups to act out their 
own relationships to the nation and its politics. During the 
holiday's early official years, anarchists and organized workers 
often boycotted the Bastille Day ceremonies as celebrations of a 
bourgeois revolution and glorifications of a bourgeois regime -- 
even though the bunting and street festivals appeared mainly in 
working-class neighborhoods. The .victory parade for World War I, 
on 14 July 1919, temporarily drew all but the far left into the 
celebration, despite the fact that the great band marched bp the 
eminently bourgeois path from the Place de la Concorde to the Arc 
de Triomphe. 
Then doctrinal splits .reappeared: the 1st of May for 
organized workers, the 8th of May (Joan of Arc's feast day) for 
the royalist right, 11 November (Armistice Day) for organized 
veterans, Bastille Day for republicans who were willing to 
tolerate or even support the Republic. 
There were more. With the fiftieth anniversary of the paris 
Commune, in 1921, the newly-formed Communist Party marked the 
division within the left by mounting its great show on Sunday 29 
May. Battling with anarchist hecklers and a Catholic procession 
along the way, some 20,000 Communist supporters paraded to the - Mur 
des ~6de/r&s in ~ 8 r e  Lachaise cemetery. veterans of the Commune, 
now fifty years older than in 1871, went in honor to Federation 
Wall. 
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As the site of 1871's massacre of Communard leaders, the wall 
nicely symbolized Communist determination to right past wrongs. 
So much so that when leaders of the non-Communist left decided in 
1926 to commemorate the Commune for themselves with a march to the 
wall, -they took care to choose another day from the Communists' 30 
May (A.N. F~ 13322). With the multiplicatio? of destinations in 
the late 1920s (in 1928, for example, Clichy's Communists gathered 
at their city's war memorial), followers of competing political 
factions had their choice of dates, itineraries, and endpoints. 
Thus the relative fragmentation or unification of memorials to the 
Commune registered the extent of disunity on the left. 
Each of the sectarian celebrations provided a welcome 
occasion for counter-demonstrations by opposing parties. 
Armistice Day. became a favorite time for antimilitarist 
demonstrations during the 1920s, and Bastille Day a preferred 
occasion for Communist displays of contempt for official 
republicanism. In 1929, for instance, sellers of Communist 
periodicals appeared at many municipal ceremonies in Parisian 
suburbs on 14 July; they and their comrades often heckled the 
official parades and staged small marches of their . own. In 
Montereau : 
toward 11:30 P.M., the band had just played the Marseillaise 
in the courtyard of the city hall after the torchlight parade 
when 500 Communists invaded the courtyard singing the 
Internationale. The police chief had to call gendarmes to 
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get rid of the demonstrators. One sergeant was punched. A 
demonstrator named ~rousselle was arrested and taken to the 
gendarmerie. The demonstrators ,having threatened to break 
down the doors if their comrade wasn't freed, the gendarmerie 
commander of Melun sent in a squad of Republican Guards, and 
order was restored toward 4 A.M. (Le Temps 15-16 July 1929: 
Competing shows of strength and opposition continued. 
A Right, and then a Left 
During the next few years, a new theme became more prominent. 
'Increasingly, Fascists and right-wing nationalists became the 
targets of organized leftists and vice versa. At first, Italian 
Fascists and domestic rightists attracted the most attention; in 
fact, Italian leftists often fought their right-wing countrymen. 
As ~itler gained power in Germany, however, his supporters 
likewise entered the fray. 
In the early 1930s, nevertheless, domestic nationalists such 
as ~ction Fransaise and Croix de Feu far outshadowed echt Fascists 
I 
of Italian or German persuasion. Action Fransaise became adept at 
finding occasions to display their nationalism at the expense of 
the government or of left-wing opponents. A case in point was the 
French adaptation of a German play on the Dreyfus case at the 
~hgstre du Nouvel-Ambigu (Boulevard Saint-Martin) in February 
1931. At the showing of 19 February "Beginning with the second 
act, demonstrators spread through all classes of seats, shouted 
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various things, threw stinkbombs, and forced the actors to stop 
the play"; police fought to expel them from the theater, and 
finally succeeded. They took 75 Action Fran~aise activists to 
arrondissement police headquar'ters (Journal des Debats 20 February 
1931: 2) . 
On the following days, activists battled counter- 
demonstrator~ in the streets. Fights continued night after night 
into March. At the request of the Croix de Feu, Police Prefect 
Chiappe then banned the play. His decision sco'red a political 
victory for the right. On the rescinding of the ban under 
political pressure two weeks later, the right-wing coalition made 
the streets outside the theater so unsafe that the play closed 
after two more performances (Weber 1962: 298). The Camelots du 
Roi , shock troops of Action Fran~aise, had outmaneuvered both 
their leftist counterparts and the city's police. 
A rhythm sounded through those turbulent years: occasion, 
demonstration, counter-demonstration, repression, tallying of 
gains and losses, new occasion. Although 1931, 1932, and 1933 
brought many a battle, the following three years, 1934-19.36, stand 
among the century's leaders for conflict in the Ile de France. 
January 1934 alone sounded a drumroll of incidents: 
3 January: 525 automobile workers in Nanterre went on strike 
against wage cuts. 
5 January: 170 foundry workers of Noisy-le-Sec likewise 
struck against wage cuts. 
6 January: Hawkers of left-wing and right-wing newspapers 
fought each other in front of the ~ y c g e  Henri IV. 
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9 January: After the newspaper Action Fran~aise called for 
demonstrations outside the Chamber of Deputies to protest the 
ties of the "thieves" and "assassins" in the government to 
the swindler Sacha Stavisky (officially reported to have 
killed himself on the 8th, and widely believed to have been 
murdered to keep him quiet) , Camelots du Roi assembled on the 
Boulevard Saint-Germain, blocked traffic, tore up trees, 
railings, and benches, and battled police, but failed to 
reach the Chamber. 
11 January: Camelots in larger numbers tried unsuccessfully 
to reach the Chamber, smashing and battling more vigorously 
than they had on i h e  9i:h. Tilt? :3a!ns day, several hundred 
commuters "demonstrated" to protest the delay of a train from 
the Gare du Nord, and a group of suburban right-wing 
activists returned to Versailles from the doings in Paris, 
then broke into a Radical Socialist meeting there to 
challenge the speakers, as well as to fight with the audience 
(Journal des Debats 13 January 1934, Le Temps 13 January 
1934) . 
12 January: Although heavy rain and negotiations with the 
police dispersed the main body of Camelot demonstrators 
without a fight, a group of sixty-odd activists marched from 
the Place de ltOpera toward the Place de la Republique 
struggling with policemen and shouting CONSPUEZ [prime 
minister] CHAUTEMPS. Pol ice arrested Charles Moreau (a 
member of ~olidarit4 Fran~aise, accused of shouting "Bandes 
de vaches, vous dgfendez les voleurs") and Pierre Arniaud, son 
of a former Action Fransaise leader, who refused to keep 
moving (A.N. F' 12963). 
14 January: As 400 Croix de Feu members gathered for a 
commemorative ceremony, 200 Communists appeared to 
demonstrate against them. police struggled, with imperfect 
success, to keep the two groups apart. 
18 January: In Levallois, 150 bodymakers struck against wage 
cuts. 
22 January: At yet another call of Action Frangaise, 
demonstrators once more appeared on the Boulevard 
Saint-Germain, shouting, smashing, fighting, building 
barricades, yet failing to reach the Chamber. Later, a 
reported 3,00! unionized public service workers jammed the 
Place de ltHotel de Ville to protest reductions in their 
benefits. 
23 January: Another 2,500 right-wing activists took to the 
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streets of the ÿ at in Quarter with essentially the same 
routines as on previous outings, and saw 325 of their number 
arrested. On the same day, about 180 Parisian metalworkers 
went on strike against the reorganization of work routines, 
as 19 mirror-makers in Courbevoie struck' to call for the 
rehiring of a fired colleague. 
24 January: 350 Parisian metalworkers went on strike against 
wage cuts. 
27 January: In Stains, 20 foundry workers struck against 
wage cuts. In Paris, meanwhile, perhaps 10,000 people, 
called and spearheaded by Action Fransaise, gathered. to 
demonstrate at the Place de l1op6ra; police barely stopped 
them from crossing the Place de la Concorde and the Seine to 
the Chamber. During the day, the Minister of Justice, and 
then premier ~hautemps' himself, resigned. 
The right-wing crowds of-Paris had helped bring down a government. 
Stavisky, Chiappe, aid Daladier 
In fact, they soon tumbled another one. Jean Chiappe, 
Prefect of Police, had known tie,s and sympathies on the right; 
many politicians on the left felt he had indulged the Camelots and 
other right-wing activists while repressing their leftist 
counterparts. When Radical Edouazd Daladier formed a government 
to succeed the fallen Chautemps cabinet, one of his first acts was 
to name Chiappe Resident-General in Morocco -- a prime colonial 
post, but one that would move Chiappe from Paris. Chiappe refused 
. . 
angrily. Daladier dismissed him. Soon the action in Paris 
streets began again. 
On the 1st of February, 17,500 Parisian taxi drivers struck 
against a new gasoline surtax. On 3 February, striking taxi 
drivers attacked non-striking drivers, demonstrated at the Place 
de la ~#publique, and struggled with the police sent to disperse 
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them. The evening of 4 February (the Sunday on which newspapers 
carried the news of Chiappe's firing), Camelots practically broke 
up the Comedie Francaise's performance of Shakespeare's 
Coriolanus, with its theme of throwing the rascals out of power. 
On the 5th, they returned for more of the same. But the 6th made 
the previous -month's street battles seem trivial. 
In outline, the events of 6 February followed the pattern of 
January's anti-governmental demonstrations : a pub1 ished call for 
action in Action Franfaise, preparatory gatherings on the 
Boulevard Saint-Germain and in the Place de la Concorde, attempts 
to reach the Chamber of Deputies, barricades, combat with police, 
destruction, injuries, arrests. Yet this time the full range of 
righti'st groups -- not only ~ction Fran$aise, but also the 
Jeunesses Patriotes, the Croix de Feu, the Jeunesses ~atriotes, 
the Union Nationale des Combattants, the Fgdgration Nationale des 
~ontribuables, and others -- summoned their followers to the 
streets. And this time 14 people died. 
The Jeunesses Patriotes announced a rendezvous for "the Place 
de Greve, in front of the city hall, cradle of your communal 
liberties" and called for a march from there to the "Parlement" 
(Le Temps, 7 February 1934). The .Communist Party and the 
Communist-affiliated veterans' group ~ssociation ~Spublicaine des 
Anciens Combattants called out their rank and file for a 
counter-demonstration against fascism. On the other hand, the 
Francistes -- then the most openly Fascist of all influential 
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French associations -- decided not to risk a public appearance. 
People heeded these various calls. This time the scale 
exceeded anything Paris had seen since the great insurrections of 
the nineteenth century: the full range of right-wing groups 
mobilized plus a few from the far left, 120,000 people in the 
streets, lethal battles around the Place de la. Concorde, 14 
deaths, roughly 1,700 persons wounded and 600 arrested, the 
Daladier government brought to resign. 
Daniel ~ugrin, himself a militant left-wing Socialist, 
recalls a series of vivid scenes from that evening: police and 
d.emonstrators face to face at the Pont de la Concorde; a burning 
bus in the Place; gas pipes and the Navy Ministry likewise on 
fire; the arrival of right-wing and left-wing veterans' groups 
singing, respectively, the Marseillaise and the Internationale; a 
counter-attack of police clearing the Place de la Concorde by 
firing their guns; men falling with bullet wounds; rows of police 
blocking some of the exit routes; an older, mink-wrapped American 
woman drinking in the spectacle and exclaiming "I love Paris!"; a 
well-dressed man with a bullet swelling his cheek bellowing 
"~ssassins!"; and, at 2 A.M., an intellectual leader who took the 
occasion to show his true colors: 
hands behind his back, beard thrust ahead,. traveling the 
boulevards alone like a missile, angrily stepping over the 
debris that lies everywhere, stumbling on the cobblestones, 
gesturing as if he were shouting vengeance: my uncle ~aniel 
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~ a l d v ~ ,  who, unhinged, losing all restraint, discarding any *. 
mask, publicly declares himself. on the far right (~uerin 
1970: 69). 
Many people aligned themselves publicly with the right at the time' 
of the Stavisky riots, as these events came to be known. Yet in 
addition to bringing down another Republican government, the 
events of 6 February called forth a mobilization of the left. On 
the 7th and 9th, Communists led major anti-Fascist demonstrations; 
four more people died in the street-fighting of the 9th. On the 
12th, multiple left-wing demonstrations coupled with a 
widely-followed general strike throughout the region. The 12th 
marked a turning-point for the PCF: the first time in its history 
that it had joined other parties in a national political strike, 
the beginning of its regular use of the strike as a political 
weapon. On the 17th, the funerals of workers killed in the 
strikes and demonstrations of the 9th and thereafter became 
demonstrations of leftist determination. 
Throughout the Ile de France, furthermore, the tempo of 
strikes increased: After the general strike of 12 February came 
strikes of telegraphers (paris) and navvies (poissy) on the 14th, 
of plasterers (Rosny-sous-Bois) on the 17th, of metalworkers 
(~rgenteuil) on the 20th, of rubberworkers (Saint-Denis) on the 
21st, of more metalworkers (Clichy) on the 26th, of boxmakers . 
(paris) and navvies (~chgres) on the 28th. Through it all, 
furthermore, striking taxi drivers and their blackleg competitors 
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bloodied each other in the streets. For the rest of 1934, 
organized workers, employers, leftist activists, militant 
rightists, and government forces interwove their many conflicts. 
Popular Front vs. National Front 
For over two years after, indeed, demonstrations, 
counter-demonstrations, and clashes in the street joining some 
combination of left-wing activists, right-wing activists, and 
police arrived in quick succession. As anti-Semitic and 
pro-Fascist actions became more common on the right, left faction's 
began to ally with each other. In June and July 1934, with the 
blessing of Moscow, the Socialist and Communist parties worked out 
. an agreement for unified action against the right-wing menace. By 
the time of the extensive leftist demonstrations of Armistice Day 
(11 November) 1934, Socialists and Communists were talking 
frequently of a general strike as the way to left solidarity and 
political power. During 1935, a Popular Front -- more clearly 
.unified by its opposition to right extremism than by any shared 
t 
program -- began to form. The Communist-led CGTU and the larger 
nonpartisan CGT started work on a merger. After long preferring 
other factional holidays, a reunited left made the 14th of July 
1 1935 an immense demonstration against fascism. 
With the elections of April-May 1936, a coalition of 
Socialists, Radical-Social-ists, and Communists actually came 'to 
power. In May of that year began a great national wave of sitdown 
strikes. Strikes in which workers took over the premises 
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temporarily had occurred in France as far back as 1920. From 1933 
to 1935, workers had occupied the premises of several major 
firms, including Citroen and Simca. Still, France had never 
before seen anything like the flood of May-June 1936. 
Factory occupations began well outside Paris -- in the Aisne, 
the Haute-Garonne, and the seine-~nfgrieure -- during the first 
two weeks of May. In Toulouse and Le Havre, sitdowns began when 
managers fired workers who took May Day off; in both cases, the 
intervention of the mayor led to reinstatement of the discharged 
workers. In the first occupation of the Paris region (at the 
Bloch aircraft, factory of Courbevoie, beginning on 14 May), 
workers won their point in two days without direct intervention of 
authorities. But even there, both sides consulted extensively 
with government officials, and the officials watched nervously. 
From then on, occupying workers commonly demanded not only 
the satisfaction of their immediate grievances, but . also the 
establishment of collective bargaining and regular worker 
representation within their plants. TJIetalworkers in particular 
and the CGT in general had been making those two broad demands 
since the end of World War I. Now they became urgent and 
widespread. With Socialists ,and Communists about to join Radicals 
in control of the national government, workers began to demand 
power. The annual march to Federation Wall, on 24 May, brought 
600,000 demonstrators into Parisian streets. During the following . 
week, sitdown strikes swept through the large metalworking plants 
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(especially those in aviation) around paris. After a pause for 
the Pentecost vacation, sitdowns spread farther on 2 June. The 
country's largest strike wave so far had begun. 
Inside the plants, occupying workers organized their daily 
lives and their politics. In the great Renault plant of 
i3illancourt, which had 33,000 workers, the sitdown began on 28 
May. At the behest of Communist organizers, ,who were bargaining 
with Renault's management, workers left the plant on the evening 
of, the 29th. They returned to the occupation ,' however, after the 
I 
weekend. According to one of the participants: 
We organized food service right away. We let down baskets 
from the window on a rope and brought them back up full of 
bread, sausage, drinks, and cigarettes. After two days, we 
had the women leave. Inside, we organized dances and games. 
There were parades with Communist and Socialist flags. It 
, . was a real carnival. It lasted three weeks (R. Durand 1971: 
6 6 ) .  
During the first week of June, millions of French workers were 
doing the same thing as their comrades in Billancourt. 
Before 1936, 1919 had been France's most strike-filled year; 
in 1919, about 1.3 million French workers took part in 2,047 
strikes. 1936's figures, then, had no precedent: 2.4 million 
workers in 16,907 strikes. Some 330,000 workers struck in the 
Seine alone. 
Twelve thousand of the year's seventeen thousand strikes 
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began in June. Nine thousand of them involved workers' occupation 
of their workplaces. Every region of France had far more than its 
usual number of strikers. Nevertheless the strikes, especially 
the large sitdown strikes, concentrated in the northern band from 
Paris to Flanders. Over France as a whole, the rates of strikes 
and strikers ran higher where large plants prevailed and where the 
left 'had received more votes in ~ p r i l  and May. In the course of 
the movement, proletarian workers in large shops rushed into the 
unions of the CGT. In 1936, as never before, wage workers in 
factories, department stores, and big offices called for change. 
Agricultural and public-service employees were the only large 
groups of wage-workers not to participate extensively. 
No revolution occurred, but the movement shifted the national 
position of organized labor. On 4 June, Leon Blum's Popular Front 
government took office. Hard bargaining, and some public 
posturing, over the strikes began. The manufacturers' association 
unsuccessfully demanded evacuation of factories prior to ' a 
settlement. Chiappe, now elected president of the Paris city 
council, ostentatiously assembled the council's executive 
committee to discuss problems of "security and food supply" 
(Schwarz 1937: 79). In the Chamber debate of 6 June, Blum 
presented his plan to submit bills establishing collective 
bargaining and binding contracts; he received a vote of 
confidence. That weakened the employers' position. 
By 8 June, the strikes had brought industrialists, organized 
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labor, and the government together in the Matignon Agreement, a 
deep transformation of the relations among the three. That 
agreement required management to accept collective bargaining, 
non-discrimination against union members, no penalties for 
striking, elected union delegates to management, and increases of 
7 to 15 percent in real wages. The Matignon Agreement, in short, 
satisfied the chief demands of major labor federations. Organized 
labor gained a legal standing it had never before enjoyed. 
At that point, national union leaders discovered limits to 
their power. As the immediate parties to the Matignon Agreement 
called for strikes to end, some unions and many workers continued 
the struggle. They sought advantages not built into the national 
accord: annual vacations, special wage agreements, particular 
hiring procedures, amelioration of local working conditions. New 
sitdowns occurred in smaller shops, including retail 
establishments, into ,July. Although Communist chief Maurice 
Thorez delivered his famous declaration that "You have to know how 
to end a strike" on 11 June, only a week or so later did 
individual settlements start accumulating into a net decline of 
the national strike movement. 
A £  termath 
On Bastille Day 1936, workers turned out in even greater 
numbers than for the demonstration of unity on 14 July 1935; they 
had a grand victory to celebrate. Yet the great boost to the 
power of the political left and of organized workers neither 
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squelched bosses, eliminated strike waves, nor silenced activists 
of the right. The Blum government's devaluation of the franc, its 
refusal to intervene in the Spanish civil war, and other 
controversial decisions weakened its connections with different 
parts of its constituency. Its official return to financial 
orthodoxy in March 1937 reassured capitalists, but marked another 
large compromise of its initial program. 
As the Popular Front government faltered, its supporters 
urged it to go farther. At the same time, its enemies mobilized 
to regain position. Industrialists and their national association 
dragged their feet on the completion and execution of the 
plant-by-plant contracts required by the ~atignon agreement. 
Although the pace of strike activity slowed dramatically after 
June,.workers now occupied their plants and stores much more often 
than they had before May 1936. 
When the Blum government dissolved the Croix de Feu, 
Jeunesses ~atriotes, Francistes, and ~olidaritg Fransaise on 19 
June', some went underground and some reincarnated under new.names; 
Colonel de la Rocque's Croix de Feu, for instance, reappeared as 
the Parti Social Fran~ais. As early as the end of June 1936, 
militant right-wingers appropriated' the tricolor as their badge, 
and thus provoked leftists into attacking the national flag. 
~emonstrations, counter-demonstrations, and fistfights of the 
Parti Social and the Parti Communiste again incited each other. 
The government's own activities as law-enforcer sometimes 
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encouraged its enemies and alienated its allies. In October 1936, 
for example, pol ice forcibly dislodged sitdown strikers from the 
Chocolaterie des Gourmets in the rue Violet. Battles between 
left-wing activists and groups of the right (such as the affair in 
Aulnay-sous-Bois on 21 January 1937, when Communists attacked 
sellers of the Parti Social's paper Le Flambeau) likewise tended 
to bring in the police on the side of reactionaries. 
Rightist organizers took advantage of that fact. On 16 March 
1937, four or five hundred members of the parti Social gathered in 
a Clichy cinema, thereby taking their message to the middle of 
Paris' working-class Red Belt. Five or six thousand demonstrators 
assembled at the city hall in response to a call from the city's 
Communist officials. Riot police then protected the cinema from a 
thousand of the demonstrators. police gunfire, possibly started 
by shots from the crowd, killed five people and wounded three 
hundred more, including ~ 6 o n  Blum's chief of staff. The fusillade 
de Clichy occasioned both a CGT-called general strike and a giant 
funeral procession for the victims. When the Blum government . 
resigned in June 1937, however, nothing like the demonstrations 
and strikes of its birth accompanied its demise. 
True, an important new round of strikes, including sitdown 
strikes, started in the fall of 1937. Occupation of the big 
Goodrich plant in Colombes (23 December) and a general strike of 
Paris' public services (28 December) made a return to May or June 
1936 seem possible. Indeed, February 1938 brought yet another 
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surge of occupations in the provinces. Blum (minus his former 
Communist allies) returned to power in March; at once ~arisian 
metalworkers began to recapitulate June 1936. That ended the 
parallels: In its 1938 reprise, Blum's cabinet fell in four weeks, 
and the strike movement fell away without persuading many 
employers to sign or honor collective contracts with their 
workers. 
~uring the rest of the year, events turned badly for the left 
end of the coalition that had made the popular Front. Although 
scattered sitdown strikes occurred into the fall of 1938, plant 
owners were increasingly successful .in calling .the police to empty 
the premises. A growing share of conflicts .involving workers 
consisted of struggles between strikers and nonstrikers, between 
members of rival unions. Now when department store employees 
paraded through the Boulevard Haussmann to protest firings of 
their fellow workers, police easily broke up their marches. 
After the Reynaud government announced its austerity measures 
on 12 November, workers organized wildcat strikes in major plants 
of the Paris regipn while union leaders temporized. On 24 
November, the management of Renault announced its own austerity 
plan, rescinding the gains of the Popular Front; when workers laid 
down their tools and occupied part of the plant, management called 
in the government's armed force; the evacuation of the plant was 
violent but successful. Then Renault shut down the plant 
indefinitely. By the time the CGT decided (on 25 November) to 
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call a general strike for the 30th, most of the region's other 
strikes had ended. rf the big plants of the banlieue rouge 
responded well to the one-day strike call, results in Paris itself 
were very uneven; covered with a dense net of troops and police, 
the city continued to function. On 11 December 1938, Edouard 
Daladier formed a government far to the right of its predecessors. 
Clearly capital and amred force were joining hands. 
The Popular Front heaved its last sigh on 12 February 1939, 
the fifth anniversary of the 1934 general strike. A week earlier, 
the government had refused amnesty to the hapless strikers oof 30 
November. On the 12 th, twenty-five thousand marchers (fewer than 
in previous years) went through the motions: demonstration in the 
Place de la ~ g ~ u b l i ~ u e ,  appearance of Leon Blum, singing of the 
Internationale, minor scuffles with the police, 40 arrests. 
Thereafter the rapidly changing directives from Moscow tore the 
Communist Party from its former allies. The mobilization .of 
French industry for war, furthermore, divided Socialists and 
absorbed workers into a temporarily expanding economy. 
Governmental repression, justified by the approach of war, 
tightened. Employers took advantage of the changed governmental 
attitude to tighten on- the- job discipline and fire union leaders. 
Before the Nazi conquest of June 1940, the whirlwind of the 1930s 
had already blown away. 
Repression, Resistance, and Release 
From mid-~ay to mid-June 1940, Paris underwent one of the 
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most startling transformations of its history. within a month the 
metropolis went from maelstrom to mausoleum: from a great city 
through which millions of people fleeing the advancing German 
armies wheeled and dragged their movable possessions to a 
silenced, darkened, depopulated prize of war. By 13 June, the 
national government had deserted Paris. So had more than 
two-thirds of the city's residents. The Germans who rolled in the 
next day rapidly imposed their own order. Under Nazi military 
occupation, the former capital felt, the tightest grip of 
governmental repression it had ever experienced -- even more 
severe repression than the city had felt during the early empires 
of the two Napoleons. Just to make its commanding position clear, 
each day at noon the occupying army marched a detachment of troops 
up the Champs ~ l ~ s g e s  to the Arc de Triomphe, where they passed in 
review. 
If the conquering 'Germans were now free to tramp through the 
streets, almost no one else was. With German encouragement, 
nevertheless, a number of Fascistic groups of varying tints 
organized, uniformed themselves, and strutted about attacking 
Jews, Freemasons, Communists, and other enemies. Most of these 
collaborating pseudo-parties were tiny and .ephemeral; only the 
Mouvement Social ~6volutionnaire (reconstituted from the Cagoule 
by Eugene Deloncle), the Francistes (led more or less directly 
from the Third Republic into the Occupation by Marcel Bucard), the 
Rassemblement National Populaire (a new creation of Marcel ~ 6 a t )  
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and, especially, the Rassemblement pour la ~dvolution nationale 
(Jacques D O ~ ~ O ~ ' S  German-authorized version of his Parti Populaire 
Fran~ais) had much size and continuity. The larger groups 
survived within limits set by the German administration, and as 
instruments of its control over the French population. 
Although the few hundred Communists remaining in paris toward 
the end of 1940 kept a semblance of their organization, at that 
moment of relatively cordial relations between Moscow and Berlin 
leading Communists were advocating a measure of cooperation with 
the occupier, and agitating for the liberation of comrades whom 
the now-dead Third Republic had imprisoned. Neither part of the 
program, however, lasted very long; some Communists had quickly 
turned to resistance at the occupation, and all plans for 
cooperation exploded when Germany attacked the Soviet union in 
June 1941. 
Soon after, both the occupying forces and the Vichy 
government began-the active pursuit of Communists -- imagined and 
real, past and present. In September 1941, bothered by murders of 
their troops in occupied France, the Nazis adopted the policy of 
executing 50 to 100 imprisoned Frenchmen, Communists before the 
rest, for each German soldier killed. Both the occupying forces 
and the Vichy government, to -be sure, used the label Communist 
freely, but their very broad use of the label tended to identify 
authentic Communists with opposition to the new regime. 
Communists soon formed the best organized and most active nuclei 
Ile de France 38 
of resistance to the Germans and their collaborators. 
Open defiance was dangerous and difficult. Those Parisian 
energies that were not commandeered or snuffed out by the 
occupying power and its French collaborators flowed mainly into 
survival, individual and collective: the creation of escape 
routes, information channels, black markets, and networks of 
mutual aid. Slowly and later, however, a few of these' half-hidden 
structures became means of collective resistance. 
In the Paris of 1940, students were one' of the few groups to 
build a collective political' life that did not .lie under direct 
German control. University authorities reopened their doors soon 
after the occupation began, in order' to avoid having the 
conquerors take over their facilities. The Germans, for their 
part, chose to leave the university and other educational 
institutions in operation under surveillance. Students at the 
Sorbonne created an underground culture of resistance: jokes, 
slogans, rituals, anonymous tracts. At the arrest of Paul 
~angevin, the well-known leftist academic, on 30 October 1940, 
students and professors campaigned for his release; graffiti, 
tracts, and word of mouth spread the message. On 8 November, at 
the scheduled time for Langevin's course, a crowd of supporters 
I dared to gather outside the College de France and demand that he 
be freed. 
On Armistice Day, 11 November 1940, groups of students and 
I 
teachers gathered on the Champs ~lysges; some of them shouting 
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"Vive la France" and "Vive de Gaulle" outside cafes frequented by 
members of Fascist youth organizations. Although city police 
broke up those crowds, about a thousand demonstrators marched up 
the Champs ~ l ~ s g e s  to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc 
de Triomphe. Later, some of them regrouped outside Fascist 
rneeting places, shouting and singing. police chased them, but 
were unable to clear the streets. When German troops arrived 
around 7 P.M., they charged with clubs, guns, and grenades. It 
took about 'a quarter of an hour, three or four serious injuries, 
and over a hundred arrests to end the action. 
In broad outline, demonstrations of this sort had been 
everyday occurrences in the turbulent days of the Popular Front. 
Now, under military occupation, that even one demonstration should 
occur bespoke extraordinary organization and determination. 
Repression raised the stakes and altered the scoring system. As 
I 
repression deepened, resis Lance shifted to assassination, 
smuggling, sabotage, and protection of people threatened by 
. . 
occupiers and collaborators; demonstrations and similar actions 
I virtually disappeared. In the Ile de France, four years of 
occupation brought a great decline in popular collective action. 
The occasional escapes from control came as comets in a dark 
night. Small demonstrations occurred in 1941: near the Place de 
la ~gpublique on Bastille Day, and at the Porte Saint-Denis on 13 
August. In 1942, students demonstrated at the tycse i3uffon on 10 
March; on 31 May, women broke into a food storehouse on the rue de 
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Buci. For these and a few other rebellious gatherings, the 
Germans retaliated quickly and fiercely. 
Faced with severe repression, Parisians found more subtle 
ways to display their solidarity. Pierre Audiat recalls what 
happened on 8 November 1942, when news came of a British .landing 
in French Morocco: 
Early in the afternoon, a crowd of Sunday strollers went to 
the major streets, spilling out into the roadways as on 
holidays. Montmartre had the atmosphere of a silent village 
fair; from ~arbhs-~ochechouart o the Place Clichy, there was 
a continuous, packed parade of apparent idlers who were, in 
fact, demonstrators. People looked at each other smiling; 
when German soldiers went by, discreet scorn showed in their 
eyes and lips (Audiat 1946: 196). 
When a phalanx of blueshirts belonging to. Doriot's pseudo-party 
rumbled down the Champs ~lysges later that afternoon, the crowds 
in the streets greeted them with disciplined silence. Silence 
could be a safe, effective weapon; students and faculty at the 
Sorbonne, for example, commemorated Armistice Day 1943 by means of 
a single minute of intense, concerted stillness (Audiat 1946: 
224). 
1943 was no doubt the darkest year of all, with students who 
had demonstrated at Buffon put to death on 8 February, prisoners 
executed almost daily at the Fresnes prison, Jews being rounded 
up, herded into camps and shipped off to Germany, able-bodied 
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Gentiles being dispatched to work in German industry, shortages 
and hardship intensifying throughout the year, Allied bombardment 
of paris and its suburbs becoming more intense. Organized quiet 
stifled a scream. 
Not until Bastille Day 1944, six weeks after the Allied 
landing . in Normandy, did another major public display of 
opposition occur in Paris. On that day, a Communist-organized 
group of workers dared to march along the boulevards. They 
managed a demonstration of 45 minutes before German troops 
dispersed them, killing one demonstrator in the process. After 
German forces began evacuating Paris on 9 August, first railroad 
workers (10 August) and then police (15 August) went on strike. 
The next large action occurred on 19 ~ugust, when Allied troops 
were approaching Paris and the French puppet government had fled 
from Vichy to Belfort; that uprising shook off the control of the 
remaining Germans and their collabdrators. 
Gunfire rattled the capital foe allnost a week. By 25 August, 
however, Leclerc's army had entered Paris and the Germans had 
> 
surrendered. Charles de Gaulle arrived late that day. For all 
its joy, it was a delicate moment: In the face of competing claims 
from the American commander and from several factions of the 
Resistance, de Gaulle meant to establish his own embodiment of the 
French state, and therefore of legitimate rule. He managed to 
outplay his competitors. He refused, for example, to go through 
the nineteenth-century routine of declaring a Republic from a 
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balcony of the Hgtel de Ville; the Republic, he claimed, had never 
dissolved; it had merely gone. into exile in his custody. The man 
had confidence and determination. 
On the following day, de Gaulle enjoyed a city-wide 
celebration. This time a grand motorized parade proceeded down 
the Champs Elysees from the Arc de Triomphe to the Place de la 
Concorde, then by the rue de Rivoli to the H6tel de Ville, finally 
to Notre Dame for a Mass of victory -- an itinerary whose later 
stages recalled great processions before the Revolution. 
Paris Revives 
"Is Paris burning?" asked Hitler as his troops retreated. 
His dreams of empire shattering, he hoped passionately for the 
destruction of Paris. His followers failed him. Although German 
occupiers packed explosives into the Eiffel Tower, Notre Dame, and 
other great monuments, they never got around to detonating them. 
The city went almost free. Paris had only the wrecking of the 
Grand Palais and scattered damage from earlier Allied bombing to 
show for its liberation. As compared to London, Berlin, and a' 
number of other European capitals, France's capital emerged from 
World War 11 physically intact. 
Yet the Ile de France had much rebuilding to do. The war had 
destroyed a great deal of the capital's political and 
organizational structure. The French had to reconstitute a 
government of their own, restart an exhausted economy, and 
recreate social bases for both of them. A depression decade, four 
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years of occupation, and another year of war at the region's edge, 
furthermore, had left the physical plant itself in decay. ~t 
needed a great deal of refurbishing. Parisians took up the work 
with impressive energy. Over the country as a' whole, production 
tripled in the twenty years from 1946 to 1966. The renewal' of 
paris played a major part in that speedy expansion. 
As Figure . 1 shows, the postwar period changed the 
relationship between the Parisian population and that of the rest 
of France. After nearly two centuries of very slow increases and 
occasional decreases, France's overall population rose rapidly 
from 40 million in 1946 to 50 million in 1968. The city of Paris, 
however, did not share in the increase; after fluctuating at a 
little under 3 million residents from the beginning of the 
twentieth century to around 1960, its size began to decrease 
rapidly: 2.8 million in 1962, 2.6 million in 1968, 2.3 million in 
1975, 2.2 million in 1982. Through most of the two centuries, 
Paris' share of the national population had increased steadily -- 
from 2 percent in 1801 to 7 percent in 1921. Now it began .to 
sink, reaching 4 percent in 1982. 
Those numbers refer to the city of Paris, not to the whole 
built-up area centering on the city. If, to make comparison 
possible, we take the population in the department of the Seine 
(or, from 1968 onward, the slightly-larger area occupied by 
Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-St.-Denis and Val-de-Marne) as an 
approximation of the number in built-up areas, we see the 
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I 
beginnings of strong suburbanization around 1900. We also see the 
slowing of suburban growth with the Depression of the 1930s, the 
decrease. due to the Second World War, a spurt of growth from 1946 
to the late 1960s, and then the start of a decline. At that 
point, the agglomeration centered on Paris was still growing, but 
growing largely through new constructi'on outside the old limits of 
the Seine. 
. The postwar ~eriod also altered the national position of . the 
Ile de France (broadly and crudely. defined as the Seine plus 
seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne, Oise, and Aisne before 1958, as 
Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-St.-Denis, Val-de-Marne, Val-d'Oise, 
~velines, Essonne, Seine-et-Marne, Oise, and Aisne thereafter) . 
Although the region's share of the total French population has 
increased more or less continuously 'since some time in t h e  
eighteenth century, until World War 11 the region's growth 
resulted almost entirely from increases in Paris and the Seine. 
Since the war, the rest of the region -- especially the section 
close to Paris -- has increased disproportionately. A vast 
metropolitan complex has formed around the Parisian -nucleus. 
Although it looks superficially like dispersion, this process has 
concentrated even more of France's precious resources in and 
around one giant city. 
The logic of concentration took a while to tell, but within a 
few years of the war it was working as powerfully as ever. 
Throughout the twentieth century's first four decades France's 
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really expensive activities -- major industrial plants, scientific 
research, arts and entertainment, governmental administration, and 
a great deal more -- accumulated disproportionately in the Paris 
region. Almost by definition these activities, with their high 
ratios of capital to labor, concentrated valuable facilities more 
rapidly than population. 
After the 1950s, the appearance of tall buildings in the 
Paris skyline gave telling evidence of that concentration; even 
the apartment buildings, such as those springing up around the 
Place dtItalie and at the Fronts de Seine, generally rep'laced 
rundown high-density housing with lower-densi ty housing for 
families with higher incomes. Those families included far more 
than their national share of people staffing big organizations and 
expensive facilities. The construction of towers for business and 
ceseasch, as in La ~gfense, Montparnasse, and Censier , followed 
the logic of concentration quite directly. 
As .a result of th-ese processes, Pari's' share of the national 
population -- as great as it is -- has long run far below its 
share of such, critical facilities as banks, ministries, rail 
connections, newspapers, publishing houses, research centers, 
corporate headqua,rters, libraries,'large factories, universities, 
or computers. Despite repeated gestures toward decentralization, 
most of these Eacilities have built up in the Paris region far 
faster than population. They have continued to build up, 
furthermore, as the city's resident population has started to 
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decline. Facilities and income per capita have generally risen 
more rapidly in the Paris region than elsewhere in France. That 
means growing inequality. 
Second, the total population of the city of Paris itself 
changed little during the first half of the twentieth c e n t l ~ r y .  In 
the 1960s, it finally began to decline noticeably, as business, 
government, and transportation took over high-density dwelling 
areas and as the relatively high-income people remaining in the 
city expanded their housing. In the neighborhoods of les Halles 
and Saint-Merri, for example, population declined more than 30 
percent between 1968 and 1975. What happened? As the monumental 
Centre Georges Pompidou and the huge Forum des Halles went up, 
developers cleared small merchants and low-income households from 
the area. The old residents gave way to offices, shops, 
galleries, restaurants, and luxury apartments. Res~i i l : :  a 
subs l ?o t i a l  decrease in the stock of housing for low-income 
people. Another result: a greak  irlccease in the daytime, 
non-resident population in the area. 
Over the city as a whole, the net effect of many such changes 
has been to reduce the total population. It has also shrunken 
the proportions of petty-bourgeois and working-class families, 
sharpened the contrast between rich and poor, increased the number 
of old people, decreased greatly the number of children, and 
swollen the foreign-born population. In contrast, the built-up 
area ringing the city and the satellite towns around the built-up 
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center continued to grow. 
Planners and developers favored the new urban geography by 
, means of a sort of radial segregation: vast, high-density housing 
developments for poor people along some radii outside the city, 
new single-family or low-density housing and shopping centers for 
richer geople along others. Increasing numbers of ~arisians 
commuted long distances to work in o,r near the center. A genuine 
measure of the ciizy's evolution would have to include these 
voyagers in its effective population. 
Postwar Struggles 
The liberation of Paris did not end the war. German troops 
had retreated from most of France by the end of September 1944, 
but it took months more to dislodge them from their last toeholds. 
When the European war ended in May 1945, about 1.8 million French 
citizens were still in Germany as prisoners or forced labor. 
France's transport system had fallen apart. Her industrial plant 
had suffered from almost fifteen years of decay. Factories, 
offices, and homes faced acute shortages of fuel. An immense 
black market handled distribution of food and other necessaries. 
A major part of.Francels housing had run down or disappeared. The 
French had all that to 'repair. 
The French had to repair it, furthermore, at the same time as 
French powerholders struggled to reconstitute a government. The 
provisional government that formed in August 1944 faced a 
situation resembling that of a new revolutionary regime: its 
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sovereignty and legitimacy uncertain, only a tattered, improvised 
army to back up its commands, much local administration still in 
the hands of people who had served the toppled power, thousands 
more collaborators in jails and internment camps, its own 
supporters determined to avenge past wrongs and get their share of 
influence, allies and rivals ready to struggle for a say in the 
state's future. Even the prestigious, forceful Charles de Gaulle, 
who headed the government until January 1946, encountered serious 
competition from Communists and from Resistance groups that had 
remained independent of his liberation forces. 
iJsing that political system to' restore a ruined economy 
challenged de Gaulle and his partners. Unlike many revolutionary 
rulers, de Gaulle ,incorporated his strongest rivals, the 
Communists, into the provisional government. Like the 
revolutionaries of 1792 and 1793, however, the government adopted 
a number of expedients to make the existing structure produce 
change: installing prefects having strong ties to the new rulers, 
establishing or absorbing provisional departmental committees 
simultaneously implanted in the region and personally tied to the 
government, dismantling the militias those committees had commonly 
set up at the time of liberation, sending out specially-powered . 
commissars to represent the central government, setting up special 
. courts to manage the identification and punishment of former 
collaborators, imposing rationing and requisition. 
To the array of revolutionary techniques, the provisional 
Ile de France 49 
government of 1944 added one the Jacobins had not used: In the 
fall, de Gaulle made a triumphal tour through the provinces, 
whipping up support for the new regime, and identifying it even 
more strongly with his person. As in 1792 and 1793, all these 
expedients ,-- when . they worked -- substituted central authority 
for local autonomy. 
Not all expedients worked; the government, for instance, 
never gained a tight enough grip on the supply and distribution of 
food to make rationing work well. But those efforts precipitated 
the major contention of 1944 and 1945. In fact, 1945 ended in a 
storm of complaints about food supply. On 31 December, people 
waiting in line ,at Parisian bakeries began smashing their windows 
and breaking up their furnishings when the stocks of bread ran 
out. ~hrough 1946 and 1947, for that matter, struggles over the 
government's controls over wages, prices, and food repeatedly 
brought Parisians to the streets. It was not easy to restore a 
battered economy. 
The restoration took a long time. France returned to its 
1938 level of industrial production 'around the end of 1947, to its 
1938 level of agricultural production around the end' of 1958. 
~uring the painful recovery, Gaullists, Communists, supporters of 
'the MRP (Mouvement ~gpublicain Populaire, formed on the base of 
Catholic Resistance groups) , and remnants of the prewar parties 
fought for control of the government and its policy. Within the 
labor movement, Communists finally succeeded in their long effort 
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to control the CGT, at the price of accepting a sharper separation 
between the CGT and other federations, and of contending with an 
internal minority , Force ~ u v r i ~ r e ,  that sought a 
politically-independent labor movement. 
France's internal struggles coincided with the cooling of 
relations between the u.S. and the U.S.S.R. -- and, by extension, 
of their respective allies -- into the Cold War. The 
international tugging and hauling made bargaining between French 
Communists and other parties even more difficult. 
Al.though de Gaulle left. the government in January 1946, and 
did not form his Rassemblement du Peuple Francais until April 
-1947, his followers were taking pol'itical . action long before they 
organized a party. After a Gaullist parade on 18 June 1946, 
commemorating de Gaulle's 1940 call for resistance to the Germans, 
participants regrouped to shout "de Gaulle to power." Others 
broke the window of a Communist bookstore, grabbed the books 
displayed there, and burned them; the next day, Communists and 
unionized workers mounted an "antifascist" demonstration to 
protest the attack: For the next few years, the polarization of 
Gaullists and Communists informed political conflicts at both 
local and national levels. Once leaders of the old parties forced 
Communists out of the government in May 1947, the 
~aullist/Communist struggle drastically narrowed the space in . 
which any government could stand. 
As that struggle developed, French workers return'ed to 
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large-scale strike activity. The Communist departure from the 
cabinet, indeed, resulted from Communist support for another great 
strike at the newly-nationalized Billancourt Renault plant; this 
one began on 25 April 1947 as a wildcat, but the CGT eventually 
took it over. The May Day celebration of 1947, which featured a 
march from Bastille to Concorde, ended in a confrontation between 
ineinbers of the Billancourt strike committee and the leaders of a 
stil.1-hesitant CGT. 
National strike waves occurred in June-July 1947 and again in 
November; in the November series, a national coalition demanded a 
25 percent wage increase and challenged the government directly, 
as workers once more began to occupy their plants. During that 
same strike wave, Communist deputies took a leaf from the workers1 
book -- occupying the National Assembly itself to block a bill 
imposing sanctions on industrial sabotage and incitement to 
strike; the Garde ~gpublicaine finally expelled them from the 
Chamber at 6 A.M. on 2 December. 
By this time, many of the characteristics of French popular 
politics i n  i:he 1933s had reappeared: 
-- the conjunction of strike waves with national political 
struggles and, especially, changes in the national 
political position of organized labor , 
-- the difficult, contingent alliance between national labor 
federations and the major parties of the left, especially 
the Communists 
-- the coupling of strikes with demonstrations 
-- the further matching of demonstrations by political 
groupings with counter-demonstrations by their rivals, 
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with frequent fighting a by-product of their 
confrontations 
-- the occupation of premises to emphasize a claim for power 
and forestall countermeasures of authorities. 
These remained standard elements of French political life from the 
1930s onward. 
Although French people continued to pursue plenty of their 
politics at the cafe, in the press, at peaceful meetings, and 
around the ballot box, with each new issue of the 1950s and 1960s 
the characteristic street politics reappeared. AS deputies 
debated NATO, war in Indochina, ~erman rearmament, the presence of 
~rnerican troops in France, North African independence moveinen ts, 
the anti-tax challenges of Pierre Poujade's followers, or the 1956 
insurrection- in Hungary, their allies ' and opponents outside 
demonstrated, counter-demonstrated, struck, occupied, and fought. 
Sometimes, as in the great Parisian public-sector strikes of 
August 1953, the action in the streets was the issue before the 
government. National politics and street politics intertwined. 
As compared with prewar conflicts, more of the issues that 
now brought partisans to the streets concerned international 
politics. Bombings and other attacks on premises also accompanied 
the contention more often than they had in the 1930s. As North 
African .independence movements mobilized in the 1950s, armed 
attacks by groups ' of North Africans on police, soldiers and, 
especially, cornpatriots of different political persuasions become 
relatively common. Deliberate blocking of traffic and of public 
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places likewise cha~acterized the conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s 
more frequently than those before 1940. Otherwise, veterans of 
prewar strikes, rallies, demonstrations, street fights, and other 
forms of contention found much that was familiar in the struggles 
around the new issues. 
Popular Rebellion or Coup dlEtat? 
The familiar wrought the unfamiliar. Although .all the terms 
are debatable, one can reasonably say that before 1958 i\1apoleon1s 
coup of 1799 was the last, time the French military as such 
intervened directly in national politics and played a major part 
in the destruction of a regime. Never before 1958 had the 
intervention occurred chiefly outside of continental France. By 
May 1958, French residents of Algeria had been complaining for 
months of the failure of the metropolitan government to wipe out 
the indigenous Algerian independence coalition, the Front de 
~ibgration Nationale. After a large demonstration by Europeans in 
Algiers on 26 April, the Echo d1Alger had published an. appeal to 
de Gaulle on 11 May. On the 13th, two new demonstrations -- one 
of European civilians, the other of military men -- challenged the 
~fimlin government. At the'end, some of the demonstrators rushed 
to the Governor General's palace, and took it easily. with a 
crowd outside, the occupants named a Committee of Public Safety, 
then composed a telegram to President Coty in Paris; it proposed 
the naming of a national Government of Public Safety. Many 
participants called for de Gaulle to take power. 
Ile de France 54 
On the 15th, Raoul Salan, French military commander in 
Algeria, hailed de Gaulle as the country's likely savior. Without 
committing himself openly, de Gaulle made clear in his Paris press 
conference of 19 May that he disapproved of the existing political 
system. "NOW I shall return to my village," he closed, "and I 
shall remain there at the disposal of the country1' (Maier & White 
1968: 293) . Five days later, another Committee of Public Safety 
took over Ajaccio, capital of Corsica -- not quite continental, 
but at least part of metropolitan France. The organizers of 
Algiers and Ajaccio started making plans and preparations for a 
' coup in paris itself. In the meantime, feverish consultations, 
went on in and among Algiers, Corsica, Paris, and 
Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, home of Charles de Gaulle. 
Events in the Mediterranean had wide repercussions in 
mainland France. On the 13th of May itself, before news of the 
takeover in Algiers reached Paris, a veterans' march to the Arc de 
Triomphe had turned into a demonstration for "French Algeria" then 
into a fight with police who blocked access to the Chamber and 
other likely targets (Combat 14 May 1958). After the seizure of 
~jaccio, Committees of Public Safety formed in Lyon and other 
continental French cities, if not in Paris itself. 
In Paris, prime minister Pierre ~fimlin searched for a 
combination and sent emissaries to all the parties. Y,et Pfimlin 
resigned on the 28th, after de Gaulle had issued a statement 
strongly implying his readiness to take over the government. That 
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day a military delegation from General Salan, summoned by de 
Gaulle, came to Colombey and briefed him on the situation in 
Algeria and Corsica. The same day a Republican/antifascist 
demonstration including Pierre MendGs France, Fransois Mitterrand, 
and Edouard Daladier marched from the Place de la Nation to the 
Place de la ~gpubl ique. That demonstration of the non-Communist 
left revealed another exceptional feature of the 1958 struggle: 
organized labor divided so sharply between the Communist-led CGT 
and the remaining federations that for once no major strike 
movement accompanied the crisis of government. 
iJegotiations with de Gaulle continued; they closed with his 
demanding emergency powers and a new constitution. On the 29th, 
President Rene Coty asked de Gaulle to form a new government. O n  
30 May, as the engineers of that invitation maneuvered to create 
the necessary majority, supporters of de Gaulle took over the 
Champs ~lysges, and received a degree of from the 
police. Leftist counter-demonstrators who arrived shouting 
"Fascism will not pass" and singing the Marseillaise battled 
police for about half an hour. 
This time, however, the supporters had their way: Charles de 
Gaulle received full powers from a badly-divided Chamber of 
~eputies on 1 June. That day the Communist Party made its last 
appeal; 10,000 demonstrators gathered in different parts of paris 
to oppose de Gaulle and broadcast that "Fascism will not pass"; in 
the encounters with police that followed, 190 people were arrested 
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and 50 wounded. ~eanwhile, de Gaulle was recruiting a cabinet. 
His government, drawn largely from the old parties, gained the 
approval of both assemblies on 3 June. The very next day he was 
in Algiers, declaring: 
I have understood you. I know.what has happened here. I see 
what you wanted to do. I see that the road you have opened 
in Algeria is one of renewal and fraternity (~aier & White 
1968: 347) . 
As it turned out, the road .led to Algerian independence, and to a 
massive repatriation of French nationals from North Africa: But 
its first stretch brought France to a new regime. 
' 
Days of May and June 
The institution of a Fifth Republic deflected French 
struggles, but did not end them. For another four years, all 
sides of the Algerian conflict -- competing Algerian movements, 
French settlers, dissident military officers, the French 
government, and others -- fought out their differences in the 
paris region as well as in North Africa. Taking up the theme of 
~lggrie fran~aise, far-right groups reappeared in public. 
Students again became active, both over their own local concerns 
and over national political problems. Vietnam reappeared, now in 
the context of opposition to American, rather than French, 
imperialism. Most of these themes converged with the problems of 
workers in May and June 1968. 
Beginning. in the mid-1960s, a postwar combination of economic 
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expansion and baby boom brought an unprecedented number of young 
people into ~rench' higher education. The new suburban university 
at Nanterre, among others, went up to house the overflow from the 
Sorbonne. It summed up the expansion and its consequences: rapid 
construction from scratch on a former military base in the midst 
of an immigrant working-class area; liberal arts program with wide 
offerings in the social sciences; dean interested. in promoting 
wide consultation among students, faculty, and administration; 
weak relationship between teaching programs and later employment 
of students; as of the end of 1967, no university library or 
research facilities; in short, an assembly plant for standardized 
education. 
Students at Nanterre formed a number of leftist groups, and 
gave strong support to the left-leaning UNEF (~ational Union of 
French Students); its new'school of law (an undergraduate program 
in France), in contrast, provided a base for a small but active 
group of right-wing students, centered on the Occident movement. 
On 16 March 1967, a Nanterre student organizat'ion dedicated to 
freedom of expression began a campaign for "free circulation", 
including the rights to hold political mee-tings and to circulate 
or post political material on campus. In the course of that 
campaign, 150 male students moved in with the residents of a 
women's dormitory. On 21 March, police called by the 
administration surrounded the building, and a crowd of students 
surrounded the police; after a long night of negotiations, the men 
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left the dormitory unidentified and unpunished. 
In the fall of 1967, clashes between leftist and rightist 
students intensified on the Nanterre campus. At the same time, 
the student union laur~ched a campaign against the government's 
pending reorganization of examinations and certificates. In 
November, its members organized a strike against the application 
of the reforms at Nanterre, and kept non-strikers from classroom 
buildings. Although the strike failed, it led almost directly 
into a series of actions organized around educational policy, 
campus discipline, and the war in Vietnam. The actions included 
sabotage of examinations and confrontations with authorities. 
When a Nanterre student was arrested for bombing the American 
Zxpress building in Paris, students held an unauthorized meeting 
in a campus lecture hall, then occupied the university's counncil 
chamber. That was the night of 22-23 March 1968. When leaders of 
the "22 March Movement" called for a day of Critical University, 
on the German model, on 29 March, the dean shut down classes uni : i l  
1 April. 
From that point on, student groups' multiplied meetings and 
counter-meetings, attacks and counterattacks; by the end of April, 
UNEF, 22 March, and Occident were all arming themselves. In 
paris, on 19 April 2,000 students demonstrated to protest a recent 
assault on German student leader Rudi Dutschke. On the 22d, 5,000 
demonstrated against the Vietnam war. Raids and 
counter-demonstrations set Occident againt its leftist foes at the 
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Sorbonne as well as at Nanterre. The government began legal 
proceedings against Daniel Colin-Bendit, a French-born Nanterre 
sociology student leader who had taken German citizenship, with an 
eye to deporting him. On 2 May, the dean, claiming a "war 
psychosis" had taken over in Nanterre, closed down the campus and 
hailed eight students before the university's governing council. 
Action shifted to Paris. On May Day, the CGT (permitted to 
march on the holiday for the first time since 1954) had failed in 
its effort to bring out a unified demonstration of left opposition 
to the de Gaulle regime, but had attracted many students. The 
CGT's marshals had forcefully excluded far-left groups and banners 
from the parade. On 2 May a fire, which UNEF officials blamed on 
rightist students, broke out in the Sorbonne. On 3 May (the day 
~umani t6 dismissed Cohn-Rendi t as a "German anarchist") , student 
organizations at the Sorbonne held a meeting in its courtyard; at 
the meeting, Cohn-Bendit called for protests oE fascist attacks. 
Citing the danger of attacks from rightist groups, the rector 
called police to evacuate the courtyard. Police arrested about 
600 demonstrators as they left the Sorbonne. After the expulsion, 
small groups of students skirmished with police in nearby streets. 
They continued into the night. 
On Sunday 5 May student groups called for demonstrations the 
next day, and the teachers' union asked for a general strike of 
all university faculties. On Monday the 6th, university 
authorities closed the Sorbonne, and four si:t.iderli:s G J ~ C I ~  sentenced 
Ile de France 60 
for participation in Friday's fighting. When police charged the 
file of marchers, a demonstration protesting the Sorbonne1s 
closing gave way to street-fightirig through much of the Latin 
Quarter. On 7 May, UNEF organized a march from Denfert-Rochereau, 
through the Latin Quarter, and to the Arc de Triomphe; later, 
students began throwing paving stones at police near the Sorbonne. 
Me,etings and demonstrations likewise started at :3rovincial 
universities. President de Gaulle declared that he would not 
tolerate violence in the streets. For the following two days, 
student and union organizers sought to contain the movement and 
aim it at a concerted series of demands on the government. On 
Friday the loth, however, some demonstrators (saying " w ~  have to 
occupy the Latin Quarter whatever it costs") began building 
barricades, as well as smashing or burning automobiles. Starting 
at 2 A.M., police spent the night clearing the neighborhood, 
barricade by barricade. 
After that v i o l e n t  r~ight, the CGT and CFDT called for 
nationwide demonstrations and a general strike on Monday 13 May, 
anniversary of the Algiers rebellion that started de Gaulle back 
to power. The demonstration in Paris brought out a possible 
700,000 marchers. If the strike itself was less than general, the 
appeal received a large response outside of Paris. During the day 
Premier Georges Pompidou asked for the reopening of the Sorbonne, 
and agreed to consider requests for amnesty of students arrested 
in the previous week's struggles. Arrested students did go free, 
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and discussions went on all night in the reopened Sorbonne. For 
the next few days, student assemblies began debating programs for 
reform of their institutions, and students began refusing to take 
scheduled examinations. Meanwhile, on the 14th right-wing 
students .demonstrated in paris; they repeated their 
counter-demonstrations a number of times in the fo.1lowing weeks. 
On May 14th and 15th workers in Nantes, Cleon, and Flins 
occupied their factories. On the 16th, students marched from the 
Sorbonne to the newly-struck Renault factory in Billancourt. From 
that point on, a massive strike movement grew to the dimensions of 
a general strike; in Paris, strikes paralyzed transportation, 
public services, and supplies of goods. 
In detail, many of these strikes concerned the organization 
of work and worker power rather than wages and hours. Many of 
them, furthermore, began without union sponsorship; indeed, some 
strikers resisted union attempts to channel their strikes. 
White-collar workers and employees of high-technology industries 
played a larger part than in any previous strike wave. The 
demands looked serious. President de Gaulle (declaring "La 
reforme, oui, la chienlit, rlon.") , hurried home from a trip to 
Rumania. 
When French authorities denied Cohn-Bendit reentry into France 
from Germany on 23 May, new demonstrations and new confrontations 
with police began. That same day, the Chamber voted down a motion 
of censure against the ~ompidou/de Gaulle government. The 
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following day, de Gaulle went on the air to announce a referendum 
for 13 June; he was going to consult the country on the question 
of greater participation of students and workers in the running of 
their enterprises. ~f the referendum did not pass, promised de 
Gaulle, he would resign. Tha.t night, UNEF demonstrators marched 
toward the ~ e t e l  de Ville, possibly with the idea of declaring a 
commune there; police deflected them to the Bourse, les Halles, 
and the Latin Quarter, where groups broke doors, uprooted trees, 
and built barricades. 
On the 25th, prime minister Pompidou invited representatives 
of labor and management to a general assembly at the Ministry of 
Labor. On the 27th, national labor unions emerged from that 
bargaining with wage increases and shorter hours, as well as 
commitments to establish f irm-by-firm contracts and to review the 
position of organized labor within firms, the organization of 
welfare programs, the income tax, and training for young people. 
During the next few days, however, most organized workers rejected 
that Grenelle Agreement. On the 28th, about 9 million French 
workers were out on strike. This was an unusual strike wave. Not 
only did it. set records for size and draw in professionals, 
technicians, and white-collar workersas never before, but also it 
introduced new forms of action; the general assembly of the 
establishment and the overall strike committee elected by workers 
owed something to the students' example. The demands for more 
worker control in high-technology industries, furthermore, gave 
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the strikes a new air. Nevertheless, from early in June strikes 
began to end rapidly, with particular settlements following the 
pattern of Grenelle . 
In the Latin Quarter, students continued to debate and 
reorganize in occupied buildings, as a student watch kept order. 
On 3fl May, de Gaulle announced the dissolution of the National 
,Assembly and new elections for the time of the weferendtlin. That 
same day, the president's supporters held a giant demonstration, 
similar in scale to the anti-government march of the 13th. A 
large counter-mobilization was occurring. 
During the first three weeks of June, students continued 
their work of reconstruction. Some new strikes -- notably the 
occupation of the national radio and television by its employees 
-- began. But police also began to clear resisting workers from 
occupied plants. Strike settlements accelerated, as the 
government dissolved a number of left-wing groups and forbade 
demonstrations. By the time that the elections 'of 23 and 30 June 
produced a Gaullist landslide, little remained of the organized' 
movement . 
One More May 
Fifteen years after May 1968, May Day still brought thousands 
of people to Paris streets. On 1 May 1983, after four years of 
sharp separation, the CFDT, the CGT and FEN (~gdgration de 
1'~ducation Nationale) each sent delegations to the same parade. 
Force ~uvrisre, by making its own morning march to ~ederation 
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Wall, kept the event from being quite as "unitary" as advertised. 
On a chilly afternoon, perhaps 100,000 people marched or rode (on 
floats or sound trucks) from the Gare de 1'Est to the Place de la 
Bastille, via the Place de la ~6publi~ue. This time there was a 
difference: A significant proportion of the groups represented 
other causes than organized labor: feminists, homosexuals, 
pacifists, supporters of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, opponents of 
Khomeini, opponents of the Turkish regime, ~alestinians, and many 
more. 
On the Left Bank, from the Invalides to the Pantheon, marched 
another parade. Its 3,000 participants were almost as 
heterogeneous as their Right Bank counterparts; although 
representatives of small business, complaining about government 
controls and the power of labor unions, led the march, right-wing 
students, members of ~olidaritg ~hrgtienne, the National Front, 
other anti-communist activists, and some demonstrators with 
strictly personal causes joined the procession. After the left 
marched on the Right Bank, the right marched on the Left Bank. 
Neither demonstration-parade represented the struggles of 
recent months as clearly as their predecessors in 1906, 1936, or 
1968 had. During April, medical students were on strike to oppose 
governmental reforms; the proposed changes installed examinations 
after the sixth year of medical school (like law, an undergraduate 
program in France) that would restrict the entry of students into 
popular specialties. Interns and clinic heads were likewise 
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striking because of proposed reforms, but more for involvement in 
their planning than against the principles of organization they 
embodied. During the month, dental students (whose demonstrators 
chanted "dentaire . . . en col~re!") joined the movement. 
. In the medical schools, the CGT and CFDT did not organize the 
strikes, but they played their part in maintaining them. Partly 
in response to that union presence in 'the movement against 
university reforms, law students began organizing a 
counter-movement -- similarly opposed to the refo:cms, b~.ci-. opposed 
to the Socialist government as well. They, too, mounted strikes 
and demonstrations. Their work attracted support from far-right 
forces such as the Groupe union-~gfense. On 27 April, when some 
7,000 law students from schools throughout the region converged on 
the-~ational Assembly, those who actually arrived there .instead of 
going off in separate demonstrations faced a line of riot police. 
On the 29th, another group of similar size went from the Sorbonne - 
toward the National Assembly, but likewise found the way blocked. 
On both occasions, students stoned the police, who chased them 
from the streets with tear gas, water cannon, and nightsticks. 
People began to talk of another May 1968, this one from the right. 
Nothing of the sort happened. As the university year dragged 
toward its end, and the government continued to discuss proposals 
for reform, the movement deflated. By May Day, it was already 
clear that students were too divided, and too distant from the 
concerns of France's workers, to start anything like the movement 
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of i-lay and June 1968. Nor, despite the activation of right-wing 
forces, did they have a chance to initiate another February 1934. 
Yet an observer has a strong feeling. of dGj: vu. By 1983, 
the essential forms of action by which ~arisian students, workers, 
and other groups used to make their claims had very long histories 
behind them. The routines of meeting, demonstrating, striking, 
braving the police had changed relatively little in a century. 
All parties -- organizers, participants, police, government 
officials, labor unions, others -- knew the routines well, and had 
worked out standard rules for their own involvement. The press 
regularly (if not always accurately) reported numbers, social 
composition, signs of determination, slogans, arrests, injuries, 
responses of authorities. 
Yes, there had been some changes: from the beginning of the 
century, organized workers tried the short national general strike 
as a warning to government and capital. From 1936 on, it became 
more common for strikers and demonstrators to occupy premises 
deliberately, claim rights to control those premises over the 
longer run, and bargain hard over their departure from the 
. premises. All sides adopted more powerful 'technical apparatus as 
time went on; bullhorns, soundtrucks, printed signs, riot-police 
buses, and water cannon became. cart  of the scene. Newspapers, 
radio, and television gave the activists of 1968 or 1983 coverage 
their predecessors would have envied them. 
Yet the fundamental fact is continuity. AS the issues and 
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alignments have changed, the means of action have stayed. largely 
the same. On the general principle that powerholders learn at 
least as fast as their challengers, and have much greater means to 
put their learning into practice, the probable result is this: 
most likely the collective-action repertoire inherited from the 
nineteenth century has become less and less effective as a way of 
changing the structure of power, more and more effective as a 
signal of preferences within that structure of power. The 
challengers of 1968 gave some signs of breaking through those 
limits. They failed. The challengers of 1983 did not even try. 
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